Why was Charlemagne so successful as a military leader?

This essay was given a high 2:1 in the second year of my undergraduate.

Why was Charlemagne so successful as a military leader?

Under Charlemagne’s rule from 768-814, the Carolingian realm experienced rapid expansion, largely as a result of military actions conducted by the ruler himself, or by his command. Charlemagne’s overall success as a military leader is undeniable, but there are many reasons for this.[1] Potentially most obvious are the actions and traits of Charlemagne himself, and this personal importance would seem to be definitively shown when contrasted with the latter part of his reign, when his sons played an increasing role, in the Danish campaigns among others.[2] The Carolingian military also clearly played a crucial role, and the reasons for this range from its equipment to its efficiency, its makeup and its size. Nestled among these factors are some important debates, including the extent of Charlemagne’s ability, the prevalence of heavy cavalry and the size of the armies he raised.

The obvious and possibly most important factor was Charlemagne himself. Many historians praise Charlemagne’s ability as being bordering on the supernatural, and argue that his personal qualities were vital in the military conquests of his reign, both in terms of the effectiveness of his administration and his organisational ability.[3] Oman even goes as far as stating that the ‘strong domineering spirit of the great king inspired his new subjects to undertake and carry out an adventure,’ while Nelson describes him as possessing ‘a certain constancy, steadiness or unswerving determination,’ something which he bases of Einhard’s Vita Karoli, where it is described as ‘constantia.’[4]  All of these would seem to suggest that Charlemagne was charismatic in the extreme and calm under pressure, and even if Contamine has pointed out that there is nothing to prove that Charles was an inspired strategist, he readily admits that the king was possessed of ‘extraordinary physical and moral endurance.’[5] In addition to these qualities, a recurring comment is that he was massively energetic, as is evidenced by the size of the his empire, the instance in 778 where he travelled from Spain to Saxony to put down a rebellion, and the fact that the royal itineraries were decided by campaigning needs.[6] These qualities were all useful in a military leader, and many of the historians above attribute his successes to them above all else.

Amongst these other qualities was Charlemagne’s aptitude for logistics and planning has been highly praised, both in general and with reference to the specific example of the 791 invasion of the Avar kingdom. Both contemporaries and modern historians such as Verbruggen, Halsall and France argue that Charlemagne was consistently organised throughout his reign.[7] Bowlus in particular makes the point that the use of Charlemagne’s typical ‘pincer’ movement required coordination and organisation on a large scale.[8] Others, including Collins, argue that the Charles’ long term planning only came to fruition in the initial 791 campaign against the Avars.[9] Brackmann argues differently, that the conquest of Avaria was a carefully calculated move in the series of events preceeding the imperial coronation.[10] Bachrach expands on this, stating that all long-term military planning was intended to cultivate imperial ambitions.[11] Both of these arguments would seem to strain credulity, as they would bestow upon Charlemagne an inhuman amount of foresight. While he may well have been working towards a Carolingian Empire, it is unlikely that Charles planned his military campaigns with imperial ambitions specifically in mind.

On the other side of this, Ganshof simply dismisses the Brackmann thesis, stating (correctly) that there is no evidence to support it, and this would seem to support the view that Charlemagne did not plan his campaigns with a view to being crowned emperor.[12] Collins among others argues that at least some of Charlemagne’s campaigns were purely opportunistic, and he cites both the Lombard campaign of 773/4 and the Spanish campaign of 778 as examples.[13] Both Reuter and Schieffer argue much more generally, with Reuter stating that early medieval warfare only consisted of raiding for plunder. They both continue to say that Charlemagne had no long term goals at all, and that even the 791 invasion of the Avar kingdom was merely for material gain.[14] While it is difficult to argue that Charles planned his military expeditions with his imperial ambitions in mind, it is potentially more so to contend that no preparation whatsoever went into his campaigns – as has already been pointed out: a degree of planning was required for the coordination of multiple armies. With regards specifically to the Avar campaign in 791, Collins argues that the invasion not beginning until September of that year is evidence enough of the amount of preparation.[15]

Charlemagne’s ability to inspire loyalty was also crucial to his success as a military leader, as it meant that he was able to garner support for his various campaigns. Different historians are of varying opinions as to how exactly he went about this, with such as Fouracre stating that simply being successful was enough to promote loyalty.[16] Others are far more cynical but potentially more realistic, stating that Charlemagne bought their loyalty with captured treasure, as is shown especially following Pippin the Hunchback’s rebellion in 792.[17] The fact that this loyalty extended through the different social levels also meant that Charlemagne was able to make the utilisation of his resources much more efficient.[18] While this was directly applicable to the raising of military levies, it was also useful when mobilising workforces for construction projects, such as attempting to link the rivers Rednitz and Altmühl with a three kilometre canal.[19] Even though the project was ultimately unsuccessful, it proves the extent to which Charlemagne could galvanise the population, and would therefore imply that even if short of outright devotion, the loyalty he inspired was a potent force, and one he undoubtedly utilised in his military campaigns.[20]

The various tactics utilised by Charlemagne during the course of his military expeditions have also been argued as the crucial factor determining his success as a military leader. Collins, among others, argues that Charlemagne used ‘shock and awe’ style campaigns to demoralise his enemies, and this is shown in the winter of 784/5 in Saxony, as well as perhaps more obviously at the outset of the Saxon Wars in 772 with the destruction of Irminsul.[21] Alongside, and perhaps in concert with this was the use of terror tactics, particularly against the Saxons. Most notable of these was the infamous slaughter of some 4,500 Saxon prisoners at Verden, who were said to have taken part in the Frankish defeat in the Süntel Hills in 782.[22] The effects of such tactics would have been to demoralise the Saxons, and to cow them and perhaps other foes – argued by Bowlus as being a major factor in the Avar collapse in 791-6.[23] While one might argue that this was a more general, Carolingian approach to warfare, others might cite the ultimate success in ‘pacifying’ the Saxons under Charlemagne as evidence that he introduced new shock or ‘terror’ tactics to the theatre, and that they were potentially the reason for his successes both in Saxony and Avaria.

Charlemagne’s wider strategy also undeniably contributed vast amounts to his success, and is perhaps the most convincing aspect of the argument for the king’s personal importance. Charlemagne used novel winter campaigning in 784/5 in Saxony to great effect, as shown by the fact that he forced the Saxon leader Widukund to treat with him in 785.[24] As well as this, he was able to organise marching in parallel columns, as in 791 in Avaria and 804 in Saxony.[25]  The technique of converging on an enemy from several directions at once has also been promoted, and is heralded as one of the most significant factors behind Charlemagne’s successes, whether it was in Saxony in 774, Bavaria in 787 or Avaria in 791 and 796.[26] The success of the strategies seems clear, as the Carolingian army suffered only a few major defeats, most infamously at Roncesvalles in 778, although the same technique of splitting his forces up has been blamed for the defeat.[27]

While Charlemagne obviously played a part in his military successes, a strong case can be made that his role was not as much as is suggested above. One can argue that the Carolingian military was in fact the driving force behind Charlemagne’s success as a military leader. The speed and efficiency of the Carolingian army undoubtedly played a role in the successes it enjoyed in the period, notably in the Lombard invasion of 773/4, and later when responding to the Saxon uprising of 778.[28] Riché in particular argues that the ‘rapid mobilisation and concentration of forces’ was of paramount importance for the Carolingian military.[29] The contention remains when one asks the question whether this speed of mobilisation was down to Charlemagne’s personality or the legislation he created, or whether the system already in place was effective. It is debatable how much Charlemagne would have been able to change the levy system, even with the Capitularies he introduced, and it is perhaps more convincing that the Carolingian military was efficient before Charles came to power.

As well as the efficiency of the Carolingian army, the equipment of the individual soldiers has been the subject of scrutiny, with many historians arguing that Charlemagne was more interested in raising better-equipped forces than large ones, as perhaps he predecessors had been.[30] The majority of the evidence for this is found in the various Capitularies, although the ‘Capitulare de Exercitu Promovendo,’ in 803, and those of Aquisgranense in 805 and 813 have been examined more closely by Oman and France, as they are the ones which provision for the weapons and armour of the host.[31] The general quality of Frankish equipment would seem to be beyond contestation then, but Riché points out that the repetition of many elements of the Capitularies perhaps implies their ineffectiveness.[32]

Another area in which the Carolingian military is argued to have led to Charlemagne’s military successes is in the makeup of the various armies raised. As one of the areas of greatest contention in not just Carolingian history, but wider medieval history, there is considerable debate over the role of heavy, ‘shock’ cavalry in Charlemagne’s armies. The portrayal of shock cavalry as the dominant force on the medieval battlefield was introduced by Lynn White Jr, and then developed by Brunner, and it still finds support among more modern historians.[33] The view rests on the spread of the stirrup occurring during the reign of Charles Martel, and has been challenged strongly by Bachrach and Bullough, who argue that it was only the combination of stirrups and the development of the saddle which allowed a couched lance to be used.[34] Bowlus offers an alternative, stating that artillery was the decisive arm of the Carolingian military, which seems somewhat convincing due to the primacy of sieges and fortifications in particularly the Saxon Wars.[35] Both Bowlus and France also point out that the presence of cavalry in Charlemagne’s armies did not necessarily mean that they were shock troops – that horses were used for their strategic rather than tactical value.[36] While the use of heavy cavalry might have explained some of the Charlemagne’s successes, it is unlikely that they played such a prominent role as some have portrayed, and the thesis that horses were used more as a mode of transport is much more convincing. Mounted troops did exist, as there is evidence of such in contemporary chronicles, but they were nowhere near as common as has been suggested.[37]

The size of the Carolingian army is also the subject of intense debate, and depending on the more convincing figure, is an obvious area in which one can argue Charlemagne enjoyed having superior tools at his disposal.[38] So-called ‘Minimalist’ historians such as Reuter and Bachrach argue that the armies raised by Charlemagne were smaller, more elite affairs, based around ‘scarae,’ although Bachrach does concede that there was also a mass levy, but that Charlemagne was reliant on a more select one.[39] Primarily opposing this is Werner, who argues that the ‘striking element’ of Charlemagne’s armies consisted around 35,000: part of a total of 100,000, although Reuter dismisses this as wild guesswork, stating that no town north of the Alps had a population a third that size.[40] France strikes a middle ground of sorts, arguing that armies raised by Charlemagne would not have numbered more than 20,000, but they were by no means as small as is suggested by the Minimalists.[41] Verbruggen supports this to a certain extent, although his view arguably more simple: he points out that the ‘convergence’ technique noted above by its nature required more than one amry.[42] Although the estimates are somewhat diverse, France puts forward a convincing argument, and the number he has suggested would not indicate any overwhelming numerical advantages in most theatres.

It would seem then that the most convincing reasons why Charlemagne was such a successful military leader were his personal characteristics and ability, coupled with the execution of his plans. While one might argue that he was only able to complete the extraordinary campaigns that he did due to the versatility and strength of the Carolingian military, one can also contend that a lot of this strength was a result of Charlemagne’s actions, the most obvious example being how the Capitularies affected the general standard of equipment in the Carolingian army. It also seems convincing that the efficacy of the Carolingian military was a product of the cooperation between Charlemagne and his magnates, and that by rewarding loyal service as stated above, he promoted such support.[43] In short then, while the Carolingian military clearly was important, it was nowhere near as much of a foregone conclusion as has perhaps been suggested: Charlemagne himself provided a crucial catalyst to spark the rapid expansion, and constant campaigning which characterised the greater part of his reign, and for which he is considered a greatly successful military leader.

Word Count: 2,981

 

[1] P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford & New York, 1984), p.23.

[2] P. Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul to 814,’ in ed. R. McKitterick, The New Cambridge Medieval History vol.2: c.700-c.900 (Cambridge, 1995), p.105, R. Collins, Early Medieval Europe, 300-1000 (2^nd edition) (Basingstoke, 1999), p.279, Charlemagne (Basingstoke, 1998), p.171.

[3] P. Riché, The Carolingians: A Family who forged Europe (trans. M.I. Allen) (Philadelphia, 1993), p.88, J. France, ‘The Composition and Raising of the Armies of Charlemagne,’ The Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), p.82, G. Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900 (London & New York, 2003), p.153.

[4] C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, vol.1: 378-1278 AD (London, 1998), p.78, J.L. Nelson, ‘Charlemagne the man,’ in ed. J. Story, Charlemagne: Empire and Society (Manchester & New York), p. 34.

[5] Contamine, War, p.24.

[6] Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ pp.101-2, J.L. Nelson, ‘Kingship and royal government,’ in ed. R. McKitterick, The New Cambridge Medieval History vol.2: c.700-c.900 (Cambridge, 1995), p.386.

[7] France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ p.68, Halsall, Warfare, p.149, J. France, ‘The Military History of the Carolingian Period,’ in eds. J. France and K. DeVries, Warfare in the Dark Ages (Aldershot & Burlington, 2008), p.326, Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ pp.103-4.

[8] C. Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria: The Grand Strategy behind Charlemagne’s Renovatio Imperii in the West,’ The Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), pp.55, 59

[9]  Collins, Early Medieval Europe, p.287, Charlemagne, p.93.

[10] Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ p.45.

[11] Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ p.46.

[12] Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ p.46.

[13] Collins, Charlemagne, p.75.

[14] Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ pp.43-4.

[15] Collins, Charlemagne, p.93.

[16] Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ pp.102-3.

[17] France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ p.64, Halsall, Warfare, p.76, R. McKitterick, ‘Politics,’ in ed. R. McKitterick, A Short Oxford History of Europe: The Early Middle Ages, 400-1000 (Oxford, 2001), p.53

[18] Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ p.102.

[19] Riché, Carolingians, pp.91, 108, Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ p.103.

[20] Innes argues against this to a certain extent, see Halsall, Warfare, p.77.

[21] For the winter of 784/5, see Collins, Charlemagne, p.55. For the sack of Irminsul, see T. Reuter, ‘Charlemagne and the world beyond the Rhine,’ in ed. J. Story, Charlemagne: Empire and Society (Manchester & New York, 2005), pp.187-8, Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ p.102, Collins, Early Medieval Europe, p.280, Charlemagne, pp.47-8, R. McKitterick, Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity (Cambridge, 2008), p.103, France, ‘Military History,’ p.329.

[22] Collins, Early Medieval Europe, p.285, Charlemagne, p.54, Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ p.103, McKitterick, Charlemagne, p.104.

[23] Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ p.56.

[24] Collins, Charlemagne, p.57.

[25] Oman, Art of War, p.85, Collins, Charlemagne, p.93.

[26] In general, see Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ p.49, Halsall, Warfare, p.147, France, ‘Military History,’ pp.329-30. For Saxony specifically, see Collins, Charlemagne, p.48.

[27] Halsall, Warfare, p.147.

[28] Contamine, War, pp.26-7, for the invasion of Lombardy, see Bowlus, ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria,’ p.47, for 778, see Fouracre, ‘Frankish Gaul,’ p.102.

[29] Riché, Carolingians, p.91.

[30] Halsall, Warfare, pp.168-9, McKitterick, ‘Politics,’ p.49, Riché, Carolingians, p.90, S. Coupland, ‘Carolingian Arms and Armour in the Ninth Century,’ Viator 21 (1990), pp.30, 38.

[31] Oman, Art of War, pp.78-80, France, ’Military History,’ pp.326-7.

[32] Riché, Carolingians, p.90.

[33] L.T. White, Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962), pp.1-38, also see A. Ayton, ‘Arms, Armour, and Horses,’ in ed. M. Keen, Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford, 1999), p.188, Riché, Carolingians, p.90.

[34] D.A. Bullough, ‘Europae Pater: Charlemagne and his achievement in the Light of Recent Scholarship,’ English Historical Review 85 (1970), pp.84-90, B.S. Bachrach, ‘Charles Martel, Shock Combat, the Stirrup and Feudalism,’ Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 7 (1970), pp.47-75.

[35] C. Bowlus, ‘Warfare and Society in the Carolingian Ostmark,’ Austrian History Yearbook 14 (1978), pp.4-5.

[36] France, ‘Military History,’ p.325, Bowlus, ‘Warfare,’ p.12

[37] McKitterick, ‘Politics,’ p.49 and Oman, Art of War, p.84  both argue for an upsurge in numbers, challenged in Halsall, Warfare, p.185.

[38] Oman, Art of War, pp.79-80, Riché, Carolingians, p.90, France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ p.62, Halsall, Warfare, p.119, Contamine, War, p.25.

[39] France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ pp.62, 69, Riché, Carolingians, p.90,

[40] See France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ p.69, T. Reuter, ‘The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,’ in eds. P. Godman and R. Collins, Charlemagne’s Heir: New perspectives on the reign of Louis the Pious (814-40) (Oxford, 1990), pp.391-405.

[41] France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ pp.67, 81.

[42] See France, ‘Composition and Raising,’ p.68.

[43] Halsall, Warfare, pp.73-5.

Bibliography

Airlie, S., ‘Charlemagne and the aristocracy: captains and kings,’ in J. Story (ed.), Charlemagne: Empire and Society (Manchester & New York, 2005), pp.90-102

Ayton, A., ‘Arms, Armour and Horses,’ in M. Keen (ed.), Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford, 1999), pp.186-208

Bachrach, B.S., ‘Charles Martel, Shock Combat, the Stirrup and Feudalism,’ Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 7 (1970), pp.49-75

Bowlus, C., ‘Italia-Bavaria-Avaria: The Grand Strategy behind Charlemagn’es Renovatio Imperii in the West,’ The Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), pp.43-60

Bowlus, C., ‘Warfare and Society in the Carolingian Ostmark,’ Austrian History Yearbook 14 (1978), pp.3-30

Bullough, D.A., ‘Europae Pater: Charlemagne and his achievement in the Light of Recent Scholarship,’ English Historical Review 85 (1970), pp.84-90

Collins, R., Charlemagne (Basingstoke, 1998)

Collins, R., Early Medieval Europe, 300-1000 (2^nd edition) (Basingstoke, 1999)

Contamine, P., War in the Middle Ages (Oxford & New York, 1984)

Coupland, S., ‘Carolingian Arms and Armour in the Ninth Century,’ Viator 21 (1990), pp.29-50

France, J., ‘The Composition and Raising of the Armies of Charlemagne,’ The Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), pp.61-82

Fouracre, P., ‘Frankish Gaul to 814,’ in R. McKitterick (ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval History vol.2: c.700-c.900 (Cambridge, 1995), pp.85-109

France, J., ‘The Military History of the Carolingian Period,’ in J France and K. DeVries (eds.), Warfare in the Dark Ages (Aldershot & Burlington, 2008), pp.321-40

Halsall, G., Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900 (London & New York, 2003)

McKitterick, R., Charlemagne: The Formation of a European Identity (Cambridge, 2008)

McKitterick, R., ‘Politics,’ in R. McKitterick (ed.), Short Oxford History of Europe: The Early Middle Ages 400-1000 (Oxford, 2001), pp.21-58

Nelson, J.L., ‘Charlemagne the man,’ in J. Story (ed.), Charlemagne: Empire and Society (Manchester & New York, 2005), pp.22-37

Nelson, J.L., ‘Kingship and royal government,’ in R. McKitterick (ed.), The New Cambridge Medieval History vol.2: c.700-c.900 (Cambridge, 1995), pp.383-430

Oman, C., A History of The Art of War in the Middle Ages, vol.1: 378-1278 AD (London, 1998)

Reuter, T., ‘Carolingian and Ottonian Warfare,’ in M. Keen (ed.), Medieval Warfare: A History (Oxford, 1999), pp.13-35

Reuter, T., ‘Charlemagne and the world beyond the Rhine,’ in J. Story (ed.), Charlemagne: Empire and Society (Manchester & New York, 2005), pp.183-94

Reuter, T., ‘The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,’ in P. Godman and R. Collins (eds.), Charlemagne’s Heir: New perspectives on the reign of Louis the Pious (814-840) (Oxford, 1990), pp.391-405

Reuter, T., ‘Plunder and Tribute in the Carolingian Empire,’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 35 (1985), pp.75-94

Riché, P., The Carolingians: A Family who forged Europe (trans. M.I. Allen) (Philadelphia, 1993)

White, L.T., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford, 1962)

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General Comments and Advice: You generally make good use of the historiography (but don’t name historians without citing them), and give your own opinions, but you need to use the evidence of, and quote from, primary sources. Try to pull the answer back to the question at the end of each section; it would have been particularly helpful had you summarised at the end of sections of more than one paragraph – you have, for example, two paragraphs on planning and logistics, but you end with a specific instance rather than a helpful summary of your argument. There was more to say about how Charlemagne achieved aristocratic buy-in – without it, all his tactical ability etc would have been worthless and he wouldn’t have been able to raise armies of any size. Christian ideology was another, related area worthy of consideration. And what about opposition to Charlemagne – was it up to much?

The formatting of the footnotes and bibliography is very nearly perfect (small issues highlighted).

 

How did the Romans respond to the threat posed by Sassanian Persia and how effective was that response?

This is the first in my series of undergraduate essays, which I’ll be putting up once a week (on Saturdays).

I will be putting them up in chronological order of the subjects considered, with each essay being followed by a complete bibliography of the texts cited, and then the general feedback provided by my tutors.

This essay was given a high 2:1 in my first year at university.

How did the Romans respond to the threat posed by Sassanian Persia and how effective was that response?

The threat of Sassanian Persia was unlike anything the Roman Empire had faced since the Punic Wars, with a few of their leaders being comparable to Hannibal in terms of their skills as military leaders. The offensive capability of the Sassanian armies initially stunned Roman generals; their much improved mobilisation by comparison to their Parthian predecessors, combined with their skilled use of siege warfare was a fearsome combination[1]. As well as this, the Sassanians made great advances in the building of fortifications[2], which were to have a significant impact on the value of the various Roman responses through the period.

The response from the Roman Empire to this new and challenging threat was almost exclusively based in the military, and in foreign policy. The Roman military response can be divided into the actual campaigns and raids undertaken across roughly four centuries, and the instigation of various reforms which included the make-up and organisation of the Roman forces in the area, and the definition of the frontier. Alongside and frequently resulting from this, there was the more diplomatic side, which included the assorted peace settlements. The latter was distinctly in the minority in terms of the overall Roman response. The response to the danger presented by the nascent Sassanian Empire had differing levels of success, ranging from successful campaigns such as that of Carus in AD 283, who invaded Mesopotamia and reached and captured Ctesiphon (the capital)[3], to the resounding failures which included that of the first invasion by Severus Alexander in the early 230s[4], as well as the countless successful raids made by Sassanian forces into Syria.

As previously stated, the Roman response was overwhelmingly military in nature, and consisted of an assortment of raids and campaigns into Sassanian territory of varying strength and success, as well as the perhaps more subtle changes in organisation of the frontier fortifications, and the forces stationed there. The initial Roman military response was led (as mentioned prior) by Severus Alexander in the 230s: a campaign which aimed at capturing a greater portion of Armenia, but was resoundingly unsuccessful[5]. Following this, there were further planned invasions by Gordian in 244, Valerian in 260, Aurelian in 275, Carus in 283, Julian in 363 and finally much later by Heraclius in 626. These campaigns almost exclusively failed, for a range of reasons. Gordian was killed, “by the treachery of Philip who reigned after him,”[6] Valerian was defeated or tricked and captured or killed, depending on which source is read.[7] Aurelian was assassinated before setting off, and Carus was to a certain extent successful but was ultimately killed during a thunder storm in Ctesiphon, following which his superstitious troops fell back.[8] Julian’s expedition looked promising until he realised that he was unable to take the heavily fortified Sassanian cities, including Ctesiphon, despite his veteran army of 60,000. This fact turned his invasion into a mere raid, however large, and he turned back for Roman territories and was harried by the more mobile Sassanian army, eventually leading to his mortal wounding and death.[9]

The Roman Empire also made internal changes in response to the danger of the Sassanian Empire. The vast majority of these were made up by reforms, both in the distribution and make-up of Roman forces, and how well the frontier was defined (particularly by the construction of fortifications). There are various historiographical debates, most of which are addressed by Isaac[10] surrounding how much the various sources and archaeological evidence should be interpreted by modern historians.

One of the more useful sources for determining the organisation of the late Roman army is the Notitia Dignitatum; a late fourth century document showing the disposition and location of units. The Notitia Dignitatum shows that there were increasing numbers of cavalry units, including the emergence of equites sagitarii or horse archers, and heavy cavalry (clibanarii or cataphractarii) on the eastern frontier.[11] These types of troops were very similar to those used by the Sassanians, the worth of which had been proven time and again when used against the Romans. It was only natural therefore that the Romans, being a very pragmatic military force would adopt successful troops and tactics as their own.

As well as the new expanded use of cavalry, there began to be a differentiation between limitanei or border guards[12]  and comitatenses or soldiers of the field armies. It is suggested that this distinction began to be made from the reign of Diocletian, but it was more widespread by 325 C.E., under Constantine.[13]  As Isaac addresses however, there are limitations to the Notitia Dignitatum in that it was a bureaucratic list, and so did not provide anything but information, about the formal structure of the army (rather than the reality). Even that was fairly vague; it gave the disposition of units at undefined dates[14] which obviously meant that it is of limited accuracy. The thought was that the limitanei would defend the borders only, while the field army would move around to reinforce, or to launch raids and campaigns into Sassanian territory.

The reforms were not restricted to just the army however: increasingly different and improved fortifications emerged on the eastern frontier during the Diocletian period. The exact nature and purpose of these fortifications is debated although according to a contemporary source, Diocletian built a series of forts in the frontier regions between Egypt and Persia.[15] This series of forts could be argued to be part of the strata Diocletiana, a view which is supported by Van Berchem[16], and this coupled with the presence of a second fortified road running parallel to it arguably provides evidence of an increasing emphasis on the security of northern Syria, as a direct response to Sassanian aggression. The function of the new fortifications is debated, with Luttwak in particular making a case for the forts being used in merely a defensive capacity, as part of his ‘defence in depth’ theory,[17] conjecture which has become popular among historians. By contrast, Isaac dismisses it, pointing out that in no contemporary sources is there any evidence for a Roman strategy of ‘defence in depth,’ and that it would be incorrect to deduce too much.[18] As well smaller and separate fortifications, there was a definite improvement in the fortifications of cities under Diocletian, and this was to play a pivotal role in the Roman response to Sassanian invasions, as shall be addressed later on.

Politics also played a significant part in the overall Roman response showing it was not necessarily limited to simply military action. Initially, the Romans made the misjudgement to support the outgoing dynasty, offering the Arsacids refuge, and supporting the Arsacid king of Armenia which resulted in gaining the city of Hatra as a protectorate. This would seem only to provoke the newly established Sassasnian leadership.[19]There were despite this, periods of peace between the Roman and Sassanian Empires, and the various treaties were usually designed to be lasting. Perhaps the most notable of these resulted when Narses of Persia invaded Armenia and was thrown back by Diocletian. The peace settlement which followed compelled Persia to cede no fewer than five provinces beyond the River Tigris (the previous border). These provinces were intended (much like the conquered section of northern Mesopotamia) to be a ‘buffer’ zone against Sassanian aggression, but were lost soon after, following Julian’s disastrous campaign in 363.[20] Other settlements included the peace of Nisibis in 297, and a peace made by Kobad in the mid-fifth century. Noshirwan also made numerous peace settlements, the first of which was in 531 involving Rome paying eleven thousand pounds of gold, and the second following his later capture of Antioch, which again involved Rome paying war indemnities to the Sassanians.[21] These would seem to show that as Rome became increasingly aware it would not be able to subdue the Sassanian Empire, they became content with simply paying it off.

How successful the Roman response was is very open to interpretation. It is possible to argue that due to the fact that the Roman Empire survived past the end of its Sassanian counterpart (at least in the form of the Byzantine Empire), the measures put in place were effective. Such a view however is too simplistic, as the Roman Empire did not arguably suffer anywhere near the same external pressures in the east as the Sassanian Empire. The main reason for the fall of the Sassanian Empire was arguably the emergence and rapid spread of Islam[22], and while the Roman Empire did fragment under the pressure of the ‘barbarian’ migrations, the Byzantine Empire emerged as its recognisable incarnation. A perhaps more plausible argument for the success of Rome in dealing with the Sassanian Empire is that, although there were some very successful raids into Roman Syria and Mesopotamia, very little land was actually lost control of, with the exception of the five provinces lost in 363. The main reason for this was the improvement and expansion of the fortifications present in the area, and protecting the various cities – a result mainly of the reforms of Diocletian, and aided by Constantine’s later additions. As well as this, there were some successes on the offensive, however few. Most notably were those of Carus in 283 when he reached the Sassanian capital of Ctesiphon, and Diocletian in 296-8 who ceded five provinces from Persia as a result of a resounding victiory[23].

Despite these viewpoints, it seems overwhelmingly clear that taken individually, the Roman responses to the immediate threats of various Sassanian monarchs was woefully inadequate. This manifested throughout both the Roman offensive and defensive operations in the area. The fact that the vast majority of the various campaigns into Persia were ineffective at best, and damaging to the Roman Empire at worst clearly showed that in this respect the response was if anything, counter-productive. One end of this spectrum can be demonstrated by the planned campaign of Aurelian in 275 which never went ahead and so achieved nothing, with the other extremity (of which the examples are far more numerous) being embodied by Severus Alexander’s initial invasion in the early 230s, as well Gordian’s failed advance of 244,[24] and Julian’s later campaign in 363.

More generally, it was the increasing Roman inability to hold ground, traditionally achieved by taking towns and cities, which meant that their invasions were largely ineffective. When coupled with their obscure strategic aims, this would seem to dismiss any the potential impact of a Roman response to Sassanian aggression. The inability to capture the newly fortified settlements on both sides of the frontier meant that any military action was reduced to mere raiding, no matter on what scale. The raiding style of warfare was not necessarily suited the Roman army, whose core was made up of the heavy infantry of the legionnaires, despite the increasing amount of cavalry in their field army. By contrast, the Sassanian army maintained the traditional strong units of both light and heavy cavalry which had been inherent to the Parthian armies. This contrast meant that any incursion into Persia would have been harried by light cavalry, and as soon as the Romans decided to retreat (following the realisation that they were unable to take any meaningful territory), they would be easily caught by the far more mobile Sassanian forces, as is shown most poignantly by Julian’s retreat in 363.[25] The difference in mobility also meant that Sassanian armies were capable of taking the initiative against the seemingly ponderous Roman legions, and were more than capable of destroying superior forces.[26]

In defense, the Roman Empire was also found somewhat lacking for, while they did not really lose any significant territories for any length of time, they were incapable of dealing with the large scale Sassanian raids. Similar in nature to the Roman campaigns, there were a few very significant differences. Primarily, as already mentioned, the Sassanian armies were generally far more suited to raiding than their Roman counterparts, but also importantly, the campaign aims of the likes of Shapur I and II in particular was not to take ground at all, it was to plunder and raid, and so they were prepared for a particular style of warfare, which their Roman equivalents were not. The Roman defence system was also arguably non-existent. Although there were undeniably troops positioned to defend against small-scale, nomad raids, it is debatable whether or not there was in fact a true system for defending the frontier in place.[27] Past the improved fortifications commissioned by Diocletian at the end of the third century, the individual populations of towns and cities were generally responsible for their own defence, and any attempt at defending the hinterlands surrounding settlements was abandoned as impractical.[28] Many of these measures were arguably ineffective against the larger-scale and fairly common raids of the Sassanian army, which consistently managed to penetrate as far as Syria, and involved the occasional capture of cities, such as Antioch[29] (on the Mediterannean).

It is fair to say that the Roman response to the danger posed by the emergent Sassanian Empire was overwhelmingly military in its nature, due to the fact that it consisted almost exclusively of military campaigns, with the peace settlements usually being the results. The internal reforms too, were focused solely on the military, with the distribution of troops and the advances and construction of fortifications. While the value of the primary sources is questioned, and the function of the new fortifications is debated,[30] it is undeniable that the measures were taken in response to the Sassasnians, due to the fact that the campaigns were into Sassanian territory and also that the various construction works and reorganisations were undertaken in the reigns of Diocletian and Constantine – at a time when the only major threat in the east was the Sassanian Empire. Aside from the occasional successes in the field, the responses of the Roman Empire were largely unsuccessful, as the rivalry last for closing on four centuries, with no decisive victory for either side. The Romans did not have any lasting victories on the offensive, apart from under Diocletian, and on the defensive, despite the expansion of fortifications, and the reorganisation of the army the Sassanians were seemingly able to raid at will into Roman territory. In short, the Romans formed a military response, although it only gradually became clearer in its aims, as they massively misjudged the calibre of their opponents, and so perhaps treated them with undue contempt for far too long.[31] This inhibited the effectiveness of the response for so long that it eventually did not make much of a difference. There are obviously reasons for the seeming lack of interest in the eastern Empire, particularly later on, with the barbarian migrations resulting from the movement of nomads out of the Steppes into eastern Europe. These migrations posed an arguably much more serious threat to the stability of the Empire, and they are sometimes given as the reason for the fall of Rome.

Word count: 2,901

[1] D.S. Potter, ‘The Transformation of the Empire: 235-337 C.E.,’ in ed. D.S. Potter, A Companion to the Roman Empire, p.157-8

[2] P. Sykes, A History of Persia, p.35

[3] P. Sykes, A History of Persia: Volume 1, pp.407-8

[4] D.S. Potter, ‘The Transformation of the Empire: 235-337 C.E.,’ p.158

[5] For a full contemporary account, see Herodian VI, 5, 1-6, 6 in M.H. Dodgeon and S.M.C. Lieu (eds.) The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (AD 226-363), pp.23-6

[6] Eutropius, breviarium IX, 2, 2-3, 1 in M.H. Dodgeon and S.M.C. Lieu (eds.) The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (AD 226-363), pp.36-7

[7] M.H. Dodgeon and S.M.C. Lieu (eds.) The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (AD 226-363), pp.59-62

[8] P. Sykes, A History of Persia, p.33

[9] P. Sykes, A History of Persia: Volume 1, pp.418-22

[10] B. Isaac , The Limits of the Empire: The Roman Army in the East

[11] N. Pollard, ‘The Roman Army,’ in ed. D.S. Potter, A Companion to the Roman Empire, p.226

[12] For a fuller description, see B. Isaac, The Limits of the Empire, pp.208-13

[13] N. Pollard, ‘The Roman Army,’ p.226

[14] B. Isaac, The Limits of the Empire, p.161-2

[15] Malalas, XII, pp.308, 17-22, Ammianus Marcellinus XXIII, 5, 2, and  Procopius, de bello Persico II, 5, 2-3, in M.H. Dodgeon and S.M.C. Lieu (eds.) The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (AD 226-363), p.122, p.138

[16] D. Van Berchem, L’armée de Dioclétien et la réforme constantinienne.

[17] E.N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, from the First Century AD to the Third

[18] B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire, p.170, pp.186-8

[19] D.S. Potter, ‘The Transformation of the Empire: 235-337 C.E.,’ p.158

[20] P. Sykes, A History of Persia, pp.33-5

[21] P. Sykes, A History of Persia, pp.37-8

[22] P. Sykes, A History of Persia: Volume 1, pp.488-503

[23] Aurelius Victor, liber de Caesaribus 39, 33-6, in M.H. Dodgeon and S.M.C. Lieu (eds.) The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars (AD 226-363), p.126

[24] D.S. Potter, ‘The Transformation of the Empire 235-337 C.E.,’ p.158

[25] P. Sykes, A History of Persia, p.35

[26] D.S. Potter, ‘The Transformation of the Empire 235-337 C.E.,’ p.158

[27] B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire, p.372

[28] B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire, pp.252-60

[29] P. Sykes, A History of Persia, p.38

[30] B. Isaac, The Limits of Empire, pp.252-60

[31] D.S. Potter, ‘The Transformation of the Empire: 235-337 C.E.,’ p.158, K. Farrokh, Shadows in the Desert: ancient Persia at war, p.184

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Ammianus Marcellinus XXIII, 5, 2

Aurelius Victor, liber de Caesaribus 39, 33-6

Eutropius, breviarium IX, 2, 2-3, 1

Herodian VI, 5, 1-6, 6

Malalas, XII, pp.308, 17-22

Procopius, de bello Persico II, 5, 2-3

Secondary Sources

Dodgeon, M.H., and Lieu, S.M.C. (eds.), The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars AD 226-363: A Documentary History (London, 1991)

Elton, H., ‘The Transformation of Government under Diocletian and Constantine,’ in D.S. Potter (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford, 2010), pp.193-206

Farrokh, K., Shadows in the Desert: ancient Persia at war (Oxford and New York, 2007)

Frye, R.N., The Heritage of Persia (London, 1962)

Issac, B., The Limits of Empire: The Roman Army in the East (New York, 1992)

Luttwak, E.N., The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, from the First Century AD to the Third (Baltimore and London, 1976)

Pollard, N., ‘The Roman Army,’ in D.S. Potter (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford, 2010), pp.206-28

Potter, D.S., ‘The Transformation of the Empire: 235-337 C.E.,’ in D.S. Potter (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Empire (Oxford, 2010), pp.153-75

Sykes, P., A History of Persia (Oxford, 1922)

Sykes, P., A History of Persia: Volume 1 (London, 1930)

Van Berchem, D., L’armée de Dioclétien et la réforme constantinienne (Paris, 1952)

Feedback:

68%

Structure and argument:  Good. Argument is reasonably clear and quite well signposted. There is, however, an occasional tendency to make sweeping statements which are not borne out by the evidence. (e.g. ‘the Sassanians were seemingly able to raid at will into Roman territory.’).

Coverage and relevance: Good-Adequate. While four centuries is a large span to cover in 3,000 words, it remains the case that, despite occasional refs to later events, the main focus is very much on the 3rd and 4th century. Relevance maintained throughout.

Knowledge and understanding: Good-Adequate. Quite good, considering the relative unfamiliarity of the subject matter. Nonetheless, there are odd claims/statements (e.g. it is unclear how Hatra is relevant to Armenia, and who gained it as a protectorate; the peace settlement which in Rome gaining 5 provinces beyond the Tigris was in fact the same as the peace of Nisibis of 298/9 (rather than 297), a few lines later; Kobad did not reign in the mid-5th century; Noshirvwan’s first peace was in 532, not 531.

Use of ancient evidence: Good. Quite good use of Dodgeon & Lieu.

Use of modern discussions: Good. Quite a good range of material has been used quite well.

Referencing and bibliography: Good-Adequate. Referencing is reasonably thorough. Van Berchem is cited at n.16, but does not feature in bibliography. Format of referencing doesn’t follow a recognised system, though is clear enough as to details of sources. Bibliography of modern sources is fine. It is not usual practice to cite specific passages from ancient authors as Primary Sources: one would normally give the editions used; however, if as seems likely, these are cited from Dodgeon & Lieu, then this is the work that should be given here (rather than in Secondary Sources).

Spelling, punctuation, English: Good. Occasional careless typographical errors. Expression mostly fine.

General comments: Somewhat unbalanced in chronological focus, but a creditable effort.